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Governments increasingly use novel forms of public procurement to stimulate innovation 
in public service delivery. A notable example is pre-commercial procurement (PCP). 
Launched by the European Commission a decade ago, PCP encourages research and 
development of new solutions for the public sector. However, limited theoretical and 
empirical studies have made it difficult to assess and improve use of the model to foster 
public innovation. Based on two PCP projects in Denmark, the article aims to complete 
the first systematic and theory-based evaluation of national experiences. The evaluation 
shows that sufficient resources, participant and management commitment, and focused 
governance of the innovation process contributed to successful development and testing 
of a new solution in one of the projects. Meanwhile, technical obstacles in developing a 
prototype resulted in termination of the other project. In this case, the PCP model cannot 
accommodate significant changes to the agreed solution during the innovation process. 
 
Introduction 
The use of public procurement policies as a tool for innovating public services has 
become increasingly prominent within the EU and its member states (Petersen et al., 
2 
 
2016; Rolfstam, 2009). Innovation procurement utilizes the expertise of the private 
sector to support the development of new solutions by signaling to the market what is 
currently in demand in the public sector (Lember et al., 2011; Chicot and Matt, 2017). 
The very idea underlying this trend is to target products and services that are not ‘off the 
shelf’ and share the technological risks between purchaser and supplier (Edler and 
Georghiou, 2007). A notable example of this idea is pre-commercial procurement 
(PCP), which the European Commission adopted a decade ago (European Commission, 
2007). PCP purchases the development of new services and solutions to specific 
problems not yet addressed in the market (Rainville, 2017). Although PCP is exempt 
from EU procurement rules and excludes commercialization, the intention is to de-risk 
the usually uncertain technological development and provide a more sound foundation 
for commercialization, thereby increasing the likelihood of innovation (Edquist and 
Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2015; Rainville, 2017). In comparison, public procurement of 
innovative solutions is likewise an innovation policy instrument which  - as opposed to 
PCP  - aims to diffuse already invented solutions rather than encourage the development 







Table 1 Differences between innovation procurement models 
 Pre-Commercial 
Procurement  
Public Procurement of 
Innovative solutions  
Purpose The purpose is to purchase 
development of new solutions.  
The purpose is to diffuse and 
adopt innovative solutions. 
Public sector 
rationale 
The public actor encourages 
research and development into 
new solutions that can address 
demands and challenges in the 
public sector.  
The public actor encourages 
companies to produce more of 
a developed solution (not yet 
available in large scale), which 
is needed in the public sector. 
Model 
implementation 
The public actor(s) compare 
possible solutions proposed by 
businesses to identify the best 
suited through design and 
prototype development phases. 
It is based on risk-benefit 
sharing, competition, and 
separation from the 
commercial phase.  
The public actor(s) announce 
certain innovation needs and 
purchases the best suited 
solution. This process can be 
the result of a PCP, while the 
actual purchase takes place 
through existing procurement 
procedures. 
Source: (European Commission, 2017; Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2015) 
In recent years, we have witnessed an upsurge in studies on public procurement 
for innovation. Scholars are exploring drivers and barriers  (Uyarra et al., 2014; Smith et 
al. 2018), the influence of spatial anchoring (Uyarra et al., 2017), risk management 
(Kalvet and Lember, 2010), the role and characteristics of public procurement in 
fostering innovation (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012; Chicot and Matt, 2017;  
Raiteri, 2018), and innovation in contracting practice (Timmer, 2016). Meanwhile, PCP 
studies are scarce with the exception of a few contributions that question whether PCP 
is even a policy instrument for innovation, as it is oriented toward the supply-side and 
supports the early phases of innovation (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2015; 
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Askfors and Fornstedt, 2018; Rainville, 2017). As a result, national experiences with 
PCP have yet to be scrutinized and systematic evidence is needed to assess the use and 
effectiveness of PCP in spurring innovation. The limited research on PCPs and 
innovative procurement leaves a theoretical and empirical gap in terms of how and 
under what circumstances public procurement leads to innovation and benefits the 
public and private sectors. 
The broader aim of this article is to complete the first systematic and theory-based 
evaluation of national experiences with the PCP model known to the author. The article 
provides insights into drivers and barriers in applying the PCP model and the first 
empirical evidence of whether PCP facilitates the development of new solutions and 
creates value for the public and private partners. Due to the limited empirical and 
theoretical knowledge on this topic, there are no clear expectations regarding drivers 
and barriers to PCP to guide this study. To develop a theoretical framework, the article 
applies a program theory approach to identify which key factors facilitate a successful 
PCP process based on both general assumptions from formal theories and empirical data 
(Chen and Turner, 2012; Funnel and Rogers, 2011). The theoretical framework thus 
implements and takes the particular empirical context into consideration (Pitsis, 2015). 
This approach results in a focus on three analytical levels of structural, collaborative 
process, and participant factors that revolve around the legal framework, the interaction 
among the partners, and the characteristics of the participants. The overall aim and 
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theoretical approach leads to the following research question: How do participant, 
collaborative process, and structural factors constrain or drive the development of new 
solutions and value creation in pre-commercial procurement?  
The article addresses the research question through an evaluation of a Danish PCP 
initiative. In Denmark, policy-makers have paid increasing attention to the potential in 
innovative public procurement (Rolfstam and Petersen, 2014). In 2014, the Danish 
Market Development Fund (MDF) – in partnership with the five regional governments 
in Denmark - launched two PCP projects with the purpose of promoting innovative and 
effective solutions to two cross-hospital challenges. The Danish case thereby constitutes 
a unique opportunity to evaluate national experiences with PCP. One of the projects 
revolves around the development of an automated and efficient hospital sterilization 
center, where there is no risk for contamination of instruments (Sterile PCP). The 
purpose of the other PCP project is to develop a solution that minimizes contagion in 
hospital rooms and thereby reduces the risk of infection in patients (Contagion PCP). 
The two PCP projects use identical procurement processes to find and select relevant 
businesses. The projects consist of two phases, of which the first entails the 
development of a concrete design proposal, while the second phase revolves around 
developing and testing a functional prototype (The Danish Market Development Fund, 
2014a; The Danish Market Development Fund, 2014b). The evaluation of the two cases 
is a longitudinal study, which provides insights into what is often the ‘black box’ of 
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innovative procurement processes. Based on project documents and interviews with 
participants collected at two points in time, the longitudinal design makes it possible to 
study the development of key drivers and barriers over the course of two years.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the theoretical 
framework, followed by an introduction to the research design and methods in section 
three. The analysis in section four evaluates the two phases of each PCP case, focusing 
on identifying which factors drive or constrain the development of new solutions and 
value creation. Finally, in section five, the paper discusses and compares the role of key 
structural, collaborative, and participant factors across both cases before concluding on 
the findings and implications for further research. 
Theoretical framework: PCP program theory  
The program theory approach to developing a theoretical framework clarifies the 
underlying assumptions of how to develop new solutions and create value for the public 
and private partners. Developing program theory using existing research and empirical 
data is an iterative process. The two sources support and supplement one another in 
identifying which factors lead to innovation and value creation. The purpose is to 
analyze if these key factors are implemented according to the program theory and with 
what consequences (Vedung, 2009). The advantage is that program theory takes the 
empirical context of the Danish case into consideration but still provides a more general 
framework by drawing on formal theories and existing research. Specifically, the 
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theoretical framework in this study combines formal theories on networks and systems 
of innovation with empirical data from the Danish case (Chen and Turner, 2012; Funnel 
and Rogers, 2011).  
The empirical foundation of the framework comprises procurement documents 
and contracts from the Danish case that provide information on the formal requirements, 
outcomes, and management of the PCP. The theoretical framework is based on the PCP 
projects’ two phases and intended outcomes. In phase I, the public actors enter an 
agreement with qualified suppliers based on their proposed solutions to address the 
needs described in the tender. They have six months and a limited fee to develop a more 
concrete design proposal. Based on the specified design proposals, the public actor then 
selects businesses from phase I to continue into phase II, where a larger fee is allocated 
for testing and developing prototypes. Both phases depend on exchange of knowledge 
and expertise between participating businesses and healthcare professionals. The two 
projects vary only in their focus on addressing different needs within the hospital sector 
(Kammeradvokaten, 2014a; Kammeradvokaten, 2014b). The organization of both cases 
consists of a high-level steering committee with representatives from the five Danish 
regions that initially decided to launch the PCP projects and a secondary steering group 
established to oversee the contracts and project development. Meanwhile, the main 
forum for the collaboration and innovation process is a reference group for each PCP, 
which is in charge of the communication and exchange of knowledge among the public 
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and private participants. Reference group members include healthcare professionals 
with relevant expertise, representatives from the businesses, and an MDF representative.  
The theoretical foundation of the framework draws from formal theories on 
systems of innovation and network governance. These theories posit what drives the 
facilitation and informal governance of a network among interdependent public and 
private participants within a predetermined structure (Lundvall, 2010; Provan and 
Kenis, 2008). The theoretical perspectives shed light on which factors are key to a 
successful process in the Danish case and categorize these factors into a multi-level 
framework of structural, collaborative process, and participant factors. The subsequent 
sections elaborate on each of these analytical levels of the theoretical framework based 
on the formal theories and case documents. Figure 1 illustrates the final framework 
toward the end of this section. 
Structural factors 
The first level of factors stems in part from innovation system theory, which focuses on 
how innovation processes take place within a larger national system of networks and 
institutions. As a part of this system, public agencies fulfill an important role in spurring 
(or inhibiting) innovation through policy-making and regulation (Lember et al., 2011; 
Lundvall, 2010). PCP is an example of this role. The PCP model structures the 
innovation process through a pre-determined procurement process and contract. In the 
Danish case, the PCP model entails two phases with different purposes, a fixed budget, 
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and specified regulation with which the design proposal and prototypes must comply to 
ensure risk and benefit sharing on market conditions (The Danish Market Development 
Fund, 2014a; The Danish Market Development Fund, 2014b; Kammeradvokaten, 
2014b). Moreover, the PCP model presumes participation of several suppliers meant to 
stimulate the businesses’ efforts to develop the best possible solution 
(Kammeradvokaten, 2014a; The Danish Market Development Fund, 2014e; 
Kammeradvokaten, 2015a). Through competition, the public partner chooses the best 
partner and creates an incentive for the businesses to improve the quality and reduce the 
cost of the task (Andrews and Entwistle, 2015). A final key structural component, 
originating in the project documents, concerns the importance of resource munificence. 
In the Danish PCP case, the selected firms are partly compensated for their work to 
facilitate the development of solutions which might not otherwise have been developed 
(Kammeradvokaten, 2014b; Kammeradvokaten, 2015b). Network theory supports the 
importance of this factor, as sufficient funding, hours, and staff is expected to have  a 
positive impact on outcomes (Raab et al., 2015).  
The collaborative process 
The second analytical level of factors draws on network theory and concerns the 
collaborative process among different actors participating to gain access to each other’s 
resources and expertise (Provan and Kenis, 2008). This perspective is highly relevant 
for PCP, where business and public representatives interact within the reference groups 
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to engage in an exchange of knowledge and learning. According to network theory, 
collaboration is not without difficulties as the partners represent different organizational 
cultures, values, interests, and rules, which can lead to conflict (Klijn et al., 2015). 
Hence, relationships based on mutual trust are assumed to increase the likelihood of 
successful outcomes (Edelenbos and Klijn, 2007; Klijn et al., 2016). Although trust is 
not an explicit focus in the Danish PCP documents, they do emphasize trust and 
communication as collaborative mechanisms to ensure a focused innovation process and 
avoid conflicts (The Danish Market Development Fund, 2014d). Theories of innovation 
systems furthermore point to knowledge and learning as the core of innovation 
processes (Edquist and Hommen, 1999; Lember et al., 2011). A similar underlying 
notion is found in the case documents. The reference groups ensure representation of the 
most relevant public healthcare professionals across the country and the selected 
businesses, who can exchange knowledge in order to develop the most appropriate 
design proposal and prototype (The Danish Market Development Fund, 2014d).  
Participants 
The final level of factors to include in the theoretical framework revolves around the 
participating individuals, groups, and organizations that influence the agenda (Huxham 
and Vangen, 2000). Network theory assumes that overcoming institutional differences 
and facilitating learning and the exchange of knowledge requires some form of network 
management by initiating and facilitating interaction among the network members 
11 
 
(Klijn et al., 2010). This role can be the responsibility of a lead organization or the 
participants themselves through informal, shared governance (Provan and Kenis, 2008). 
In the context of the Danish PCP project, the procurement documents and contracts 
emphasize the importance of MDF as the designated project management 
(Kammeradvokaten, 2015b). Moreover, network theory posits that successful outcomes 
are dependent upon the competencies and commitment of the participants. Relevant 
skills and resources to deal efficiently with the task or problem at hand increase the 
likelihood of success (Nohrstedt, 2016; Provan and Kenis, 2008). The contracts and 
procurement documents  show that within the reference groups, collaboration between 
healthcare professionals with relevant expertise and the involved businesses is expected 
to foster innovation (The Danish Market Development Fund, 2014d). Moreover, the 
contract commits the businesses to ensuring that their own representatives have the 
necessary skills and knowhow (The Danish Market Development Fund, 2014d; 
Kammeradvokaten, 2014b).  
Development of new solutions and value creation 
The final component of the theoretical framework concerns the outcomes of the PCP. 
Overall, the two Danish PCP projects aim to develop new, innovative solutions to 
reduce contagion in hospital rooms and contamination of instruments respectively (The 
Danish Market Development Fund, 2014a; The Danish Market Development Fund, 
2014b). More specifically, the procurement documents state that up to five suppliers can 
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participate in the first phase to develop a design proposal that identifies the technical 
and commercial potential, which constitutes the outcome in phase I (Kammeradvokaten, 
2014a). The public partner then selects two to three suppliers to develop and test a 
functional prototype of the selected design proposals as the main outcome in phase II, as 
PCP does not entail commercialization of the developed solution (Kammeradvokaten, 
2015a). The intention is to separate the innovation process from the commercial phase 
in PCP to make it possible for the public partner to acquire knowledge and compare test 
evidence before committing to a large investment (European Commission, 2007). The 
program theory further examines the types of benefit the public and private actors gain, 
as the underlying rationale is that public-private collaboration creates positive outcomes 
that the partners could not achieve by themselves (Steijn et al., 2011). Based on initial 
interviews with public and private representatives, a successful PCP process is expected 
to produce benefits for their organizations, such as access to new markets, new 
knowledge, contacts for future use and reference, and experience with new forms of 
innovative procurement.  
Figure 1 illustrates the program theory and factors expected to influence the 
development of new solutions and value creation in both phases. 
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Figure 1 Program theory for phase I and II of the PCP study  
 
Sources: Author’s own based on project documents and the applied theory 
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Research design and methods 
The longitudinal study uses two types of data collected at two points in time to evaluate 
developments in drivers and barriers and to gain insights into the procurement and 
collaborative process. The first type of data consists of tender documents from both 
phases (description of needs, competitive conditions, and contracts). The documents 
provide information concerning the criteria for selecting businesses, the budget and 
formal framework for the collaborative process, and the purpose of the PCP. The second 
type of data is semi-structured interviews with 16 key participants from the two PCP 
projects, representing the involved businesses, public reference group members, and the 
MDF project management. Eight of the 16 participants were interviewed twice—at the 
end of phase I (Fall 2015) and toward the end of phase II (Winter 2016/2017)—due to 
their continuous participation. The other eight were interviewed at one of these points in 
time as they either left the project after phase I or joined in phase II.1  
The semi-structured interviews gained information about the participants’ 
perceptions of key factors and goals. The semi-structured approach was chosen to leave 
room to follow up on new findings, while still guiding the interviews based on the 
program theory. All interviews thus used an interview guide consisting of open 
questions that enquired about the participants’ expectations, motivation to participate, 
perception of outcomes, drivers and challenges, and how the participants addressed 
these challenges.  
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Data analysis was completed in three steps. First, interview transcripts and 
documents were continuously coded throughout the evaluation to identify drivers and 
barriers.2 The coding was based on a deductive coding scheme developed from the 
theoretical framework. The interview transcripts and documents were segmented into 
coding units referring to specific structural, collaborative process, or participant factors. 
In additional, valence codes characterized whether the given factor was perceived as a 
driver or a challenge by the interviewees (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For instance, an 
interview segment concerning an interviewee’s perception of the relationships, 
dialogue, and meetings between participants was coded as related to trust and part of the 
collaborative process. Second, to gain an overview of which factors influence the PCP, 
relational matrices compared which theoretical factors were coded primarily as drivers 
or challenges, studying the coded interview segments for further details and narratives. 
Finally, case dynamics and causal network displays (see Figures 2 and 3 in the analysis) 
compared and illustrated patterns in the two projects for each phase in terms of which 
key structural, collaborative process, and participant issues have either enhanced or 
inhibited the creation of new solutions and value (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
The assessment of outcomes is partly based on the public partners’ formal scoring 
of businesses’ performance in the procurement documents, which expresses to what 
degree the businesses’ design proposals meet the agreed specifications and public 
partners’ requirements (Kammeradvokaten, 2015a; The Danish Market Development 
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Fund, 2014a: 15–16). Moreover, the assessment uses the public and private participants’ 
perception of and satisfaction with the developed prototype, completed tests, and the 
benefits they have gained (or not). Perceived outcomes are often considered a less than 
ideal form of measurement. However, in this case, it is highly relevant to ask the 
participants themselves what they have gained from the PCP and to acknowledge that 
there is more than one legitimate criterion by which to assess performance in a network 
(Edelenbos et al., 2011; Kenis and Provan, 2009). The evaluation of the second phase is 
completed a few months before the two-year second phase is scheduled to end, which 
means that it will be an assessment of the expected or achieved outcomes at the time.3  
Analysis of the two PCP projects 
The subsequent sections analyze the drivers, barriers, and outcomes in phase I and 
phase II for each PCP project. The empirical results are then discussed across the two 
projects in the light of the theoretical framework and PCP model. 
Sterile PCP 
Phase I 
In collaboration with the reference group, the MDF selected two businesses to 
participate in sterile PCP based on the initial tender for the project. The first phase was 
characterized by challenges to the exchange of knowledge in the reference group due to 
a limited number of public representatives with insufficient resources to participate. The 
healthcare professionals in the reference group found it difficult at times to provide 
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input and collaborate with the businesses alongside their normal jobs. Based on the PCP 
contract, the public partners were obligated to put their knowledge and test facilities at 
the project’s disposal (Kammeradvokaten, 2014b). These were terms accepted by the 
steering committee that initiated the PCP project and appointed the public members of 
the reference group. The implication was that the PCP did not compensate the reference 
group members, who had to find time within their normal work hours to participate. 
This challenge resulted in some members exiting the project, while others left due to job 
changes, meaning that only a few public representatives remained to collaborate with 
the businesses.  
Because of the reduced reference group, there was only limited interaction and 
exchange of knowledge between the businesses and the healthcare professionals (phase 
I interview with nos. 9 and 11). As one of the businesses explained, the remaining 
reference group members were always committed to help, but too much time would 
pass before they could actually provide feedback and there were not enough face-to-face 
meetings to get the necessary input (phase I interview with no. 7). Instead, the project 
became dependent upon stronger formal leadership by the MDF, which became a key 
driver in phase I. The MDF worked to keep the project moving forward, thus spending a 
lot more time and resources on managing the PCP than anticipated (phase I interview 
with nos. 13 and 14). 
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Despite these challenges, phase I outcomes were to some degree achieved. The 
two companies developed and submitted concrete design proposals in an updated tender 
for phase II. However, they spent markedly more time and resources on it than expected 
in order to contact and meet hospital representatives outside the reference group to 
ensure sufficient input (phase I interview with nos. 7 and 12). From the public partner 
perspective, the selection of businesses for phase II was completed, but only two 
businesses participated in phase I in sterile PCP of which the MDF selected one to 
continue to phase II. Moreover, the MDF and the few remaining reference group 
members were in charge of evaluating the proposals. Although aided by a law firm with 
procurement competencies, they experienced the task of choosing the most relevant and 
innovative solutions as a big responsibility (phase I interview with nos. 9 and 14). 
Phase II 
In phase II, the development and testing of prototypes based on the selected business’ 
design proposal was constrained by the continued presence of challenges from phase I 
and the emergence of new obstacles. It remained difficult for the reference group 
members to find and prioritize enough time to deliver input for the business’s internal 
testing and development. Despite additional members to the group, it consisted of a 
limited core of committed members (phase II interview with nos. 8, 10, and 11). 
Although all parties perceived the collaborative relationship  as productive and trusting, 
the participating business’ expectations of and reliance on the reference group for all 
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types of input exceeded the group’s resources (phase II interview with nos. 8, 10, 11, 
and 13).  
Part of the challenge of ensuring sufficient and committed members in the 
reference group can be ascribed to limited support from the top-level regional 
management in the steering committee who initiated the PCP, and lack of awareness of 
the project in the participating organizations and hospitals. Without management 
commitment, the division of funding and responsibilities was unclear, in turn leaving 
the reference group unsure of who should take care of what and with what resources 
(phase II interview with nos. 10, 11, and 13). The formal project management by the 
MDF attempted to ensure progress and continued to be an important driver. However, 
the MDF was dependent upon the expertise of and collaboration between the reference 
group and the business to develop and test the prototype.  
Moreover, at the beginning of the second phase, the PCP faced a new obstacle of 
finding test facilities. Due to the innovative purpose of the PCP tender, there was no 
specified solution at the onset, and the PCP contract did not specify the test facility or 
whom should provide it. The regional governments and the MDF eventually allocated 
resources to help resolve this issue early on in the second phase and the public partners 
suggested possible locations (phase II interview with no. 13). However, before suitable 
test facilitates were decided on, a new challenge emerged concerning the business’ 
development of a prototype. The reference group members had questioned the progress 
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and lack of demonstration of a prototype during meetings with the business, which had 
admitted to delays and technical difficulties. However, half way through phase II, the 
business disclosed that the technological development required for the most 
innovative—and, to the public partner, most relevant—part of the design proposal was 
not feasible within the PCP timeframe (phase II interview with nos. 8, 10, 11, and 13).  
After acknowledging the technical difficulties, the business suggested modifying 
and redirecting the focus of the project. However, after exploring other options without 
finding an alternative way, the public partners assessed that it would require such 
significant changes to the PCP contract that it would conflict with the original tender 
and the terms by which the project was awarded the business (phase II interview nos. 8 
and 12). As a result, the contract was terminated.  
Contagion PCP  
Phase I 
Similar to sterile PCP, the reference group members in contagion PCP and the MDF 
selected two businesses for phase I based on a limited number of proposals from 
possible suppliers. The intention was for the two businesses to collaborate with the 
healthcare professionals in the reference group to develop a more concrete design 
proposal. However, the reference group members did not have sufficient time to commit 
to the task (phase I interview with nos. 3 and 4). The leadership in their organization or 
region appointed them with no hours allocated for the PCP and without further support 
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from the management (phase I interview with nos. 6 and 5). As one of them experienced 
it, other daily tasks and their normal workload meant that they did not actively 
participate unless called upon to do something specific (phase I interview with no. 3).  
As a result, exchange of knowledge and learning between the businesses and the 
healthcare professionals did not take place through regular meetings and interaction as 
initially planned. However, a strong commitment to the project from the private partners 
led them to go beyond the reference groups to develop their design proposals. Their 
own responsibility to ensure input from a broad spectrum of healthcare professionals 
was clear from the PCP contract and recognized by the businesses themselves (phase I 
interview with nos. 1, 2, and 12). The businesses used their network outside the project  
to get the necessary input from doctors, cleaning staff, and nurses at hospitals across the 
country. Gaining access to other healthcare professionals was easier because of their 
involvement in the PCP, which provided them with a legitimate point of contact (phase 
I interview nos. 1 and 2). 
By the end of phase I, both businesses succeeded in developing and submitting an 
updated design proposal for a solution that reduces the risk of contagion in hospital 
rooms. However, they spent more resources on the proposal than expected to ensure 
sufficient input beyond the limited interaction with the reference group (phase I 
interview with nos. 1, 2, and 12). Moreover, only two remaining reference group 
members were left with the responsibility of selecting the most qualified design 
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proposal in collaboration with the MDF and the aforementioned law firm, which was a 
difficult task (phase I interview with nos. 3 and 5). In the end, the MDF and reference 
group selected one of the proposals to continue to the second phase.  
Phase II 
In phase II, the development and testing of a prototype progressed without significant 
obstacles in contagion PCP, as the main challenges from phase I were addressed early 
on. Although a new challenge arose in terms of ensuring test facilities, the issue was 
resolved when additional resources were allocated for this purpose, as mentioned in the 
analysis of sterile PCP. The prospect of compensation encouraged one of the hospitals 
represented in the reference group to commit to providing staff and hospital rooms, 
which became a crucial driver in ensuring progress in the business’ further test and 
development (phase II interview with nos. 2, 5, 6, and 16). 
Among key drivers in phase II, the business made progress by ensuring more 
input from the reference group as well as from other hospitals across the country (phase 
II interview with nos. 2, 5, 6, and 16). While some of their own staff members and 
competencies leaving the project was a challenge, they quickly assured new 
qualifications (phase II interview with nos. 2 and 13). From the public partners’ side, 
there was a stronger representation of key skills and knowledge in the reference group 
with new members joining, increased support from the participating staff and 
management of the test hospital, and a renewed commitment among reference group 
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members to participate (phase II interview with nos. 2, 6, and 16). Some reference 
group members continued to experience lack of support from the regional and 
organizational management as a demotivating factor, along with limited time to 
participate, as in phase I. However, their own commitment to and feeling of 
responsibility for the PCP persevered, aided by improved collaborative relationships 
and an expanded reference group (phase II interview with nos. 3, 4, and 6). 
The organization of and collaboration in the reference group was not completely 
without challenges in phase II. The business’ technical and commercial focus conflicted 
somewhat with the professional integrity of the staff at the involved test facility, causing 
some collaborative issues and disagreement about the prototype tests. For instance, the 
business became interested in selling an early version of the prototype, although with 
significant differences from the agreed PCP solution, which caused some uneasiness 
and distrust in the reference group (phase I interview with nos. 3, 4, and 6). The 
technical focus likewise made it difficult for the reference group members to understand 
the progress reports from the business and hence fully engage in the exchange of 
knowledge (phase II interview with nos. 2, 3, and 5). Meanwhile, more frequent 
meetings and open dialogue helped solve these conflicts (phase II interview with nos. 2, 
3, 4, 5, and 6). Both sides agree that the exchange of information improved 
significantly, allowing for the provision of crucial input for the business in developing 
the prototype (phase II interview with nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).  
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With regard to phase II outcomes, both the business and the interviewed public 
participants expect that the development and test of the prototype will succeed within 
the timeframe. The second phase is still in progress at the time of finishing this 
evaluation and the technical development is challenging, but the involved parties have 
so far been satisfied with the progression and test results.  
Discussion  
The following sections discuss and compare which structural, collaborative process, and 
participant factors have conditioned the opposite outcomes across the two PCP projects.  
Structural factors 
The analysis shows that resource munificence was a key structural challenge across both 
phases and for both PCPs. The public reference group members struggled to find time to 
prioritize the PCP and lack of resources allocated for test facilities became an issue. 
Although additional funds were found for the purpose of ensuring test facilities, this 
solution only became beneficial in contagion PCP, where test facilities were already 
within reach and the development of the prototype on track. In sterile PCP, the lack of 
time and clarification of responsibility among the public partners continued to constrain 
progress in both phases. Moreover, the business’ technical challenges in developing a 
prototype ended the project before deciding on suitable test facilities.  
The risk sharing and competitive feature of the PCP model proved challenging to 
the development of new solutions in the Danish case. In phase I, preparatory work by 
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the MDF and a law firm helped ensure that the process of selecting businesses in both 
phases complied with general procurement rules and the PCP model (phase I interview 
with nos. 15 and 14). In contagion PCP, the PCP framework was not a source of 
conflict, as the technical development progressed as planned and contractually agreed, 
aided by a committed reference group, additional resources, and project management. In 
sterile PCP, technical difficulties in developing the prototype emerged as an unforeseen 
obstacle that led to cancellation of the contract. The two cases show that it requires 
careful preparation and completion of the procurement and contract to avoid such risks 
as state aid issues and violation of the principles of equal treatment in a publicly 
financed innovation process (European Commission, 2007; Thorgaard, 2013). However, 
reducing these risks is a challenge, as the final product cannot be specified at the onset 
of an innovation process and project feasibility is thus not guaranteed. Failure is an 
unavoidable risk associated with innovation, as the technical obstacles in sterile PCP 
demonstrate. The question is whether the PCP framework thereby induces risk-averse 
considerations for the public partner that conflict with the unpredictability of an 
innovation process and limits collaborative relations. Interviews with some public 
participants indicate that the business was considered a supplier of a specified solution 
rather than a development partner (phase II interview with nos. 8 and 10). This 
perception suggests that sharing of risks and benefits is challenging in practice.  
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Moreover, only five proposals from three businesses participated across both 
PCPs due to a limited number of initial bids (Kammeradvokaten, 2014a; 
Kammeradvokaten, 2015a; Kammeradvokaten, 2015b). Only one proposal continued to 
the second phase for each PCP. The limited number of suppliers made a few of the 
reference group members question whether the development of prototypes should have 
been left to the market (phase I interview with nos. 10 and 6). Competition among 
suppliers and separation from the commercial phase in PCP is meant to ensure 
participation from the best possible proposals before committing to a large-scale 
purchase (European Commission, 2007). However, a poorly specified tender or lack of 
competition can lead to higher costs or a lack of realization of intended quality 
improvements for the public partner (Carpintero and Petersen, 2014; Rangel and 
Galende, 2010). The limited number of bids in the Danish case indicates that the 
possibility of finding the best solution might have been compromised. The decision to 
cancel the contract in sterile PCP also brought forth retrospective concerns of whether 
the initial tender was too broad and should have been more specific to ensure feasibility, 
although a more specified tender could have reduced the innovative purpose (phase II 
interview with nos. 8 and 10). Other participants emphasized that the demanded 
solutions might not be developed at all without the PCP (phase I interview with nos. 7 





The structural challenge of insufficient resources for the participation of the public 
partners had consequences for the collaborative process in terms of the organization of 
the PCP and the exchange of knowledge. The secondary steering committee, established 
to oversee the contract and process of both PCPs, did not exist in practice except for one 
consistent member. Other members left due to job changes, conflicts of interest, and 
retirement (phase I interview with nos. 13 and 14). By the end of the first phase, the 
steering committee was abolished, thus leaving the reference group in charge, which 
consisted of only a few remaining representatives with limited time to participate. As a 
result, there was likewise limited learning and exchange of knowledge among the public 
and private participants in both PCP projects.  
While the situation improved for contagion PCP in phase II with an expanded and 
more committed group of public participants that helped drive the development and 
testing forward, the challenges persevered in sterile PCP. More members were added to 
the reference group in sterile PCP at the beginning of phase II, but only a few members 
participated, with limited time to do so. This created an imbalance, where the feedback 
expectations of the business exceeded the group members’ resources and ability to 
deliver, thus constraining progress in the development and early testing of parts of the 




With regard to the participants, a key challenge was to ensure commitment among the 
reference group members to participate actively and collaborate with the businesses, in 
part due to limited support from their organizational and regional management. This 
challenge is possibly associated with the lengthy process of the PCP, which makes 
member continuation difficult. Furthermore, the decision to participate was taken at 
higher leadership levels in the regional governments, not by the participating hospitals 
and healthcare professionals themselves (phase I interview with nos. 15 and 14).  
The commitment and ownership in sterile PCP continued to decline throughout 
both phases. Time constraints among the limited core of public reference group 
members inhibited the learning and exchange of knowledge necessary to develop a 
prototype. Meanwhile, in contagion PCP, reinforced competencies, improved 
collaborative relations, and shared governance by the public and private partners in the 
reference group became key drivers for the development and testing of the prototype.  
Finally, the MDF fulfilled an important and perhaps more demanding role than 
anticipated in both PCPs due to the challenges in the organization and commitment of 
the reference groups. The MDF project managers kept the process moving forward, 
coordinating between the partners, solving problems, keeping the few remaining 
members engaged, and by the end of the first phase recruiting new members with 
relevant qualifications. However, the realization of a functional prototype hinges on the 
business’ own governance of the development process and its collaboration with the 
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public representatives in the reference group. The active presence of a formal project 
management alone cannot drive or ensure success, as the two projects demonstrate.  
Outcomes 
The two projects achieved the intended outcomes in phase I. The businesses developed 
concrete design proposals within the six months as planned and used these in an 
updated tender for phase II. However, due to the limited learning and exchange of 
knowledge in the reference groups in phase I, development of the design proposals was 
challenging and time consuming. From the public partners’ perspective, the selection of 
businesses was also achieved within the given timeframe, but the result was 
continuation of only one business for each PCP, thus undermining the competitive 
mechanism of the PCP model. 
In phase II, the two PCP projects resulted in opposite outcomes. In contagion 
PCP, the development and testing of the prototype is expected to succeed. There are no 
tangible benefits for the business yet, and commercialization is not a part of the PCP. 
Nonetheless, the business gained access to key professionals in the hospital sector, 
expect to sell its first prototype soon after finalizing the project, and hope to establish a 
new spin-off business for the developed product. For the public participants, concrete 
benefits are limited in light of the amount of time spent on the PCP, but they developed 
their network in the field and gained new knowledge on technological trends for use in 
their respective organizations.  
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In sterile PCP, the public partners decided to cancel their PCP contract with the 
business. With regard to value creation, the benefits are limited and at a more personal 
level. For the public partners, an interest in keeping up to date on recent technology and 
for the sake of their resumes made participation worth their while, along with a stronger 
cross-hospital and regional network. As to the business, the PCP led to ideas for 
patenting other solutions. 
Finally, from the perspective of the MDF, they gained experience with and 
enhanced skills in public-private collaboration. As an attempt to try out the PCP model 
for the first time in Denmark, the MDF already used the experiences from the healthcare 
PCP to improve the design and organization of two subsequent PCPs in other policy 
sectors (phase I and II interviews with nos. 13 and 14). 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the analytical results in light of the theoretical 
framework by comparing which factors were drivers or barriers in the two PCP projects 
in each phase and with what consequences for outcomes. 
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Figure 2 Constraining and driving factors in phase I
 
RG = reference group 
 
 
Tender phase I structural factors 
Clarification of regulation, PCP model, and criteria for evaluation of proposals (+) 
Only a few suppliers submitting proposals for phase I (-) 
Structural factors 
Limited competition and number 
of businesses (-) 
Lack of time/resources for public 
reference group members (-) 
Outcomes  
Development of two design 
proposals  
Selection of one design proposal 
Collaborative factors 
Limited learning and exchange of 
knowledge in RG (-) 
Changes and limited number of 
healthcare professionals in 
organization of RG (-) 
Limited learning and exchange of 
knowledge in RG (-) 
Participant factors 
Committed businesses investing 
time and resources to develop best 
possible design proposal (+) 
Lack of regional ownership and 
RG commitment (-) 
Project management by MDF (+) 
Sterile PCP Contagion PCP 
Outcomes  
Development of two design 
proposals  
Selection of one design proposal 
Structural factors 
Limited competition and number 
of businesses (-) 
Lack of time/resources for public 
reference group members (-) 
Collaborative factors 
Limited learning and exchange of 
knowledge in RG (-) 
Changes and limited number of 
healthcare professionals in RG (-) 
Exchange of knowledge between 
businesses and healthcare 
professionals outside of PCP (+) 
Participant factors 
Committed businesses investing 
time and resources to develop best 
possible design proposal (+) 
Lack of regional ownership and 
RG commitment (-) 
Project management by MDF (+) 
+/ driving factors  -/--> constraining factors 
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Figure 3 Constraining and driving factors in phase II 
 
RG = reference group 
*Feasibility of the proposed technological development was not a part of the program theory, but is 
included in the results as a structural challenge, as it relates to the PCP contract and the framework for the 
development process. 
Outcomes 
Development and testing of new 
solution not achieved (contract 
cancelled) 
Business value: No product 
development but potential patent 
Public value: Cross-regional network 
development and personal interest value 
(Predicted) outcomes 
Development and testing of prototype 
achieved with relatively satisfactory 
results based on contract and criteria 
 Business value: Product development 
and access to the healthcare sector 
Public value: New technological 
knowledge for use in their 
organizations  
Participant factors 
Project management (+) 
Relevant competencies (+) 
Transition from phase I to phase II 
Development of three design proposals and selection of two design proposals  
Structural factors 
Resource munificence (-) 
Access to test facilities (-) 
Technological development (-)* 
Compliance with regulation and PCP model (-) 
Collaborative factors 
Establish collaborative relationships (-/+) 
Organization of RG (-) 
Sterile PCP Contagion 
Structural factors 
Resource munificence (+/-) 
Access to test facilities (+) 
Collaborative factors 
Establish collaborative relationships (+/-) 
Learning and exchange of knowledge (+/-) 
Organization of RG (+/-) 
  
Participant factors 
Limited commitment and ownership 
among RG and regions (-) 








The first systematic and theory-based evaluation of national experiences with PCP 
shows how the same framework for developing new solutions resulted in opposite 
outcomes in the Danish case. In the first phase, both projects were constrained by lack 
of resources, declining commitment among participants, and thus limited learning and 
exchange of knowledge. These challenges were to a large extent solved later on in one 
of the projects. Allocation of additional resources for testing facilities, focused project 
management by the business, and a stronger group of healthcare professionals with the 
necessary competencies and commitment contributed to the development and testing of 
a prototype. Meanwhile, in the other project, limited resources, exchange of knowledge, 
commitment among participants, and governance by the private partner constrained the 
development of new solutions. Difficulties in realizing the technical aspect of the more 
innovative part of the design proposal became the crucial obstacle that eventually led to 
cancellation of the contract. In this case, the PCP model cannot accommodate 
significant changes to the agreed solution during the innovation process. Finally, both 
projects experienced challenges in implementing the competitive feature of PCP as 
demonstrated by limited bids and business participants in the different phases. 
The involved businesses remained positive about PCP as a model for public-
private innovation. To them, the advantage is that PCP entails a pre-agreed purchase of 
research and development, along with clarification of state aid issues and procurement 
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rules. This reduces the risks of disqualification in case of a subsequent purchase. 
Moreover, the PCP resulted in product development, market access, and commercial 
aspirations for the business in the project that successfully developed and tested a 
prototype.  
The article offers several contributions to the growing literature on public 
procurement for innovation. First, by using a program theory approach to analyze the 
Danish PCP projects, the article provides the first systematic and theory-based 
evaluation of national experiences with the PCP model known to the author. The 
broader contribution lies in the lessons learned from the Danish case and demonstrating 
the use of program theory to identify key drivers and barriers in using PCP to stimulate 
innovation. For practitioners working with PCP, the study demonstrates the importance 
of ensuring sufficient resources for testing and exchange of knowledge between public 
and private participants. Prioritizing these two drivers can enhance the development of a 
solution that corresponds to the public partners’ needs. Without committed participants 
and a mediating project management to drive the process forward, challenges quickly 
arise or become difficult to overcome 
Overall, this study has taken the first step to embark on more systematic analyses 
of recent innovation policy instruments. To address both the challenges and the 
potential of novel forms of innovation procurement, we need further research and 
empirical studies of national experiences. Specifically, the results of this study indicates 
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that the PCP model induces a risk averse behavior on the part of the public partner that 
conflicts with the innovation and collaboration process. The Danish case furthermore 
indicates that PCP is a resource demanding model that is perhaps more suitable for 
cross-country or national projects with more public actors and potential suppliers to 
ensure sufficient competition. Comparative studies of the growing number of PCP 
projects within the EU and conceptual research into the theoretical underpinnings of the 
model can provide additional evidence and insights into the findings from the Danish 
case and the use of the PCP model. 
 
Notes 
1. To preserve the promised anonymity of the interviewees, no details are given 
regarding their identity and they are referred to by numbers in the analysis. 
2. NVivo 11 was used to analyze all data.  
3. The evaluation is part of a larger research project that was completed before the end 
of phase II. 
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